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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 20030056-CA

v.
TRACY VALDEZ,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance
in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8
(2)(a)(I), -4(a)(vi) & (vii) (2002), in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Fred D. Howard, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction
of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal is:
Whether, in the light of compelling evidence, the trial court committed plain error in
submitting to the jury the question of defendant's presence in a drug-free zone while he
possessed controlled substances?
The appellate court reviews an unpreserved claim of insufficient evidence for plain
error, that is, whether "the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime

charged and . . . that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court
committed plain error in submitting the case to the jury." State v Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^
17, 10P.3d346.
STATUTE
The following determinative statute is attached at Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession or use of methamphetamine in a drug-free
zone, afirstdegree felony (Count I), obstructing justice, a second degree felony (Count II),
and driving on a suspended or revoked operator's license, a class B misdemeanor (Count III)
(R. 6-7). At the preliminary hearing, Count II was reduced to attempted obstructing justice,
a third degree felony (R. 6, 26). Defendant moved to suppress evidence (R. 33-41).
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 76-77, 297). Defendant also
moved before trial to strike the drug-free-zone sentencing enhancement on constitutional
grounds as cruel and unusual punishment (R. 97,99-103). At the beginning of trial, the court
deferred ruling on that motion and dismissed Count III (R. 256; 298:112-14).
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance in a drug-free zone and attempted obstructing justice (R. 190; 298:340). At
sentencing, considering defendant's previously deferred motion, the trial court reduced
defendant's conviction on Count I to a second degree felony (R. 282,286). The trial court

2

sentenced defendant to consecutive one-to-fifteen-year and zero-to-five-year terms on Counts
I and II, respectively (R. 285). Defendant timely appealed (R. 292).
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
On March 11,2002, Orem City Police Sergeant Gary Giles, an experienced narcotics
officer, was conducting surveillance on an apartment in which drug activity was suspected
(R. 298:135-38). The apartment, located at 1565 South and 50 East, was later accurately
determined by a calibrated "lidar," a hand-held laser device, to be located within 750 feet of
the parking lot of one church and 950 feet of the parking lot of another church (R. 298:140,
161-68). The apartment belonged to Ms. Shannon Nielson, who Sergeant Giles knew had
an outstanding felony warrant. Defendant was known to be living in the apartment (R.
298:139-41; State's Ex. 2).
Sergeant Giles was conducting surveillance from a marked patrol car parked on Main
Street, from which point he had a direct view of Nielson's and defendant's apartment across
the interceding half-block (R. 298:140-41). About fifteen to twenty minutes after Sergeant
Giles arrived, someone parked in the apartment's parking lot got into a vehicle and drove
north on 50 East (R. 298:139-41). Sergeant Giles briefly lost sight of the vehicle as it
proceeded up the street (R. 298:141-42). Assuming that the car would proceed up 50 East
to 1450 South and then turn west to reach Main Street, Sergeant Giles drove north on Main
Street at the same pace of the vehicle he was following and briefly waited at the intersection

1

The facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are recited in a light
most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ^[2, 25 P.3d 985.
3

of 1450 South and Main Street (R. 298:142). The target vehicle approached, stopped at the
intersection, and then turned right (north) onto Main Street (R. 198:142; State's Ex. 2).
Sergeant Giles thought that only about thirty to forty-five seconds had elapsed from the time
he saw the vehicle leave the apartment until he intercepted it at the intersection of Main
Street and 1450 South. This was about the same amount of time the sergeant would expect
such a brief trip to take at normal speed (R. 298:143). When asked if there might have been
time for the driver to stop and talk to someone or do anything, Sergeant Giles responded,
"Absolutely not" (R. 298:143-44).
When the vehicle stopped, Sergeant Giles saw the driver v\ as defendant, with whom
he was familiar (R. 298:142, 144, 172). Sergeant Giles knew that defendant's license was
suspended (R. 298:140, 144). After following defendant's vehicle to about 1400 South,
Sergeant Giles stopped it and immediately called for backup (R. 298:142, 145; State's Ex.
2). Sergeant Giles noted that the stop was "right next" to or "mere feet" from a "shopping
center" containing "two shopping malls," which included a Media Play, an Old Navy, a Pet's
Mart, a Toys CR' Us, a Kids 'R' Us, and an RC Willey (R. 298:172-75, 199, 203).
Approaching the vehicle, Sergeant Giles asked defendant to exit, at which point Orem
City Police Officer Art Lopez arrived (R. 198:146-47, 213-14). Sergeant Giles noticed a
bottle of hard liquor with a broken seal near the center console (R. 198:145-46). Noticing
that defendant's pockets were bulging, Sergeant Giles asked defendant if he had any weapons
on him (R. 298:146-47). Defendant immediately pulled out a large folding knife (R.
198:147). Sergeant Giles then patted defendant's pockets down for weapons. He could feel
4

that there were a number of items in defendant's pockets. Defendant became nervous and
belligerent, especially as his coin pocket was patted down, and he swatted at Sergeant Giles
hand and attempted to wiggle away, and yelled that the sergeant was not entitled to frisk him
(R. 298:147-49,211,215-16).
At that point, having concluded that defendant did not appear to be under the
influence of alcohol and that the bottle was empty, Sergeant Giles handcuffed defendant and
arrested him for driving with a suspended license (R. 298:149, 182, 216). Sergeant Giles
then began removing items from defendant's pockets (R. 298:150). From defendant's coin
pocket, Sergeant Giles removed three baggies, one of which appeared and was later
confirmed to contain methamphetamine; the other two baggies were also later confirmed to
contain methamphetamine residue (R. 298:150, 154, 159-60, 183). As he located various
items on defendant, Sergeant Giles placed them on the hood of defendant's vehicle (R.
298:150). While the sergeant was preoccupied with organizing the items on the trunk,
defendant quickly leaned forward and then bent down with his face over the trunk (R.
298:155-56).
Officer Lopez, who is defendant's observed the entire patdown and arrest. Officer
Lopez is defendant's step-cousin, has known defendant his (the officer's) whole life, and has
always been on good terms with defendant and his family (R. 298:215-26). Officer Lopez
watched Sergeant Giles remove the plastic baggies and other items from defendant's pockets
and place them on the trunk of the vehicle (R. 298:217-19). Suddenly, he saw defendant lean
forward, then cock his head backward to try to grasp the baggie of methamphetamine with
5

his lips (R. 298:220-21). Officer Lopez grasped defendant around his neck and shoulder to
pull him back and at the same time ordered defendant, "Spit it ouf (R. 298:221-22).
Afterward, Officer Lopez noticed a white powdery substance on the sleeves of his uniform
(R. 298:222). After things had calmed down, defendant confided in Officer Lopez that he
did not want to go to jail because he was getting ready to pick up some more
methamphetamine (R. 298:225-26). Defendant also entreated Officer Lopez to be put in
contact with another police officer so that he could work as an informant in an effort to avoid
the current charges (R. 298:226).
The defense consisted of the testimony of three witnesses, Buddy Kummer, Stan
Johnson, and Shannon Nielson, each of whom testified that he, she, their friends, or
defendant himself had been the target of Sergeant Giles' excessive law enforcement efforts
because of their association with defendant (R. 298:235-40, 245-53,254-60,266). On both
direct and cross-examination, it was established that Kummer had been convicted of
obstruction ofjustice, withholding evidence, and possession of stolen property, and that both
Johnson and Nielson had multiple convictions for possession of controlled substances,
including possession of methamphetamine (R. 298:240, 247, 250, 260, 266-67). Neilson
admitted that she had been addicted to methamphetamine and that one of her prior
methamphetamine busts occurred while defendant was living with her (R. 298:263, 265).
Sergeant Giles testified on rebuttal that he held no personal animosity towards defendant.
Rather, defendant just kept "popping up at the nuisance houses" (R. 278-79).

6

Defendant did not move for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the State's case-inchief or at the close of evidence.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence was more than sufficient to show that defendant was in possession of
methamphetamine in two distinct drug-free zones. In the first instance, the evidence
undisputedly shows that defendant's apartment was within a drug-free zone. The evidence
also shows that he was in possession of methamphetamine when he was stopped and that he
did not have time to acquire the controlled substance in the extremely brief period during
which he was not directly observed before he was stopped. Therefore, the jury could have
reasonably inferred that he possessed the contraband when he left his apartment. In the
second instance, the evidence shows that defendant was stopped adjacent to a "shopping
center" that contained two "shopping malls" and which contained a number of stores whose
business directly and exclusively serve children and young people. Additionally, since the
purpose of the penalty enhancement statute is to protect children in locations they are likely
to frequent, the evidence was sufficient to show that the second stop was also located within
a drug-free zone.
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ARGUMENT
BECAUSE THERE WAS COMPELLING EVIDENCE THAT
DEFENDANT WAS IN TWO DRUG-FREE ZONES WHILE HE
POSSESSED METHAMPHETAMINE, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION TO THE
JURY
Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error in submitting to the jury
the question of his guilt for possession of methamphetamine while he was in a drug-free
zone. Aplt. Br. at 8-13. The claim is demonstrably without record or legal support.
A. The Plain Error Standard in a Challenge to the Sufficiency of Evidence.
A defendant who fails to move for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case-inchief must demonstrate plain error on appeal. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 17. "To demonstrate
plain error, a defendant must establish that '(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently,
our confidence in the verdict is undermined.'" Id. at U 12 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)). Adapting the plain error test to challenges of insufficient
evidence, the Holgate court stated: "Thus, to establish plain error, a defendant must
demonstrate first that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime
charged and second that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court
erred in submitting the case to the jury." Id. at f 17.
It is not necessary for the reviewing court to find that evidence at trial established guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Holgate, at J 18. "Rather, we will conclude that the evidence
8

was insufficient when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a
light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" Id. (quoting
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1212) (emphasis added).
B. The jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant
possessed methamphetamine when he left his apartment.
Defendant does not challenge that his apartment, which Sergeant Giles testified he
measured with a specialized hand-held laser device to be located within 750 feet of the
parking lot of one church and 950 feet of the parking lot of another church, to be within a
drug-free zone (R. 298:140,161 -68). See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (4)(a)(vi), -(ix) & (4)(b)
(2002) (enhancing a conviction for possession of a controlled substance one degree when
committed within 1000 feet of the grounds of a church or synagogue). Rather, defendant
claims that the evidence failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed
methamphetamine when he left his apartment. Aplt. Br. at 9-11. Defendant argues that
because Sergeant Giles briefly lost sight of him while the sergeant followed him, the
prosecution failed to dispel the possibility that defendant stopped and acquired the
methamphetamine after he left his residence and was beyond the drug-free zone
encompassing his apartment. Aplt. Br. at 10-11.

9

Defendant's argument fails because the unchallenged evidence showed that defendant
could not have stopped and acquired the methamphetamine while Sergeant Giles followed
him.
Sergeant Giles briefly lost sight of defendant's vehicle as it proceeded north on 50
East from defendant's apartment (R. 298:139-42). However, the sergeant followed defendant
by driving up Main Street at the same pace defendant's vehicle was traveling and, correctly
anticipating that defendant would turn west, waited for defendant's vehicle to approach Main
Street at 1450 South (R. 298:142, State's Ex. 2). With defendant's vehicle thereafter in sight,
Sergeant Giles stopped it one-half block further north, where he found methamphetamine on
defendant's person (R. 298:142-44, 150, 160). Sergeant Giles thought that from the time
he saw the vehicle leave the apartment until he intercepted it at the intersection of Main
Street and 1450 South only about thirty to forty-five seconds elapsed, about the same amount
of time he would expect such a brief trip to take at normal speed (R. 298:143). When asked
if there might have been time for the driver to stop and talk to someone or do anything,
Sergeant Giles responded, "Absolutely not" (R. 298:143-44).
Defendant introduced no evidence to contradict the sergeant's opinion as to the
minimal length of time he traveled before being stopped, the ready interception of his
vehicle, or the sergeant's opinion that defendant could not have had the opportunity to stop
and obtain anything during his brief travel. On this evidence, the jury could have reasonably
inferred that defendant necessarily possessed the methamphetamine when he left his
apartment, which was undisputedly within 1000 feet of two churches, and that he was,
10

therefore, within a drug-free zone. In any event, any insufficiency on this point was not "so
obvious and fundamental" that the trial court plainly erred in submitting the issue to the jury.2
C. The record and the purpose of the penalty enhancement statute
support that defendant was stopped within a drug-free zone.
Defendant argues that the "shopping center" where he was stopped and found with
methamphetamine is not a "shopping mall," and therefore not a "drug-free" zone within the
meaning of the penalty enhancement provisions of section 58-37-8 (4)(a)(vii). Aplt. Br. at
11-13.
Based on the sufficiency of evidence showing that defendant possessed
methamphetamine at his apartment, it is unnecessary to address this claim. However, this
argument fails on the facts and on its own terms.
Defendant's argument is grounded only in the prosecutor's having argued in closing
that a "shopping center and a shopping mall are the same for statutory purposes," without

2

Defendant also cursorily argues in two sentences and without any legal support
that, based on Nielson's testimony, the possibility existed that the drugs belonged to
Nielson and that defendant might never knowingly possessed them. Aplt. Br. at 11. The
Court should decline to consider this argument for lack of adequate briefing and failure to
marshal the evidence. See State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 130 (Utah App. 1997) ("A
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited
and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of
argument and research.") (citation omitted); State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, <|6, 36
P.3d 533 (failure to marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his claim of
insufficiency considered on appeal). In any event, apart from Nielson's doubtful
credibility (R. 298:261-67, 276-78), defendant's admission to Officer Lopez that he was
en route to purchase methamphetamine and his immediate attempts to grasp the packet of
methamphetamine in his mouth upon arrest compellingly show that he knew the nature of
the substance (R. 298:220-22, 225-26).
11

further record citation. Aplt. Br. at 11 (citing R. 298:304). Giles admittedly referred to the
collection of stores as a "shopping center." (R. 298:172-75,196). However, he also testified
that the stop was "right next" to or "mere feet" from a "shopping center" within which there
were "two shopping malls," which he believed placed it within a drug-free zone (R. 298:17275).3 Therefore, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the stop occurred within a drugfree zone.
Even if the sergeant's view is deemed undispositive on whether the stop was within
a drug-free zone, defendant's argument fails on its legal analysis. Defendant argues that, by
definition, a "shopping center" is not a "shopping mall":
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth
Edition, 2000, defines shopping mall as: "1. An urban shopping area limited
to pedestrians. 2. A shopping center with stores and businesses facing a
system of enclosed walkways for pedestrians." It defines a shopping center as
"A group of stores and often restaurants and other businesses having a
common parking lot." Id.
Aplt. Br. at 12.
Based on these definitions, defendant argues that "while a mall may be included as
a shopping center, a shopping center is not a mall," apparently because a "shopping mall,"
3

It is undisputed on appeal that the stop occurred within 1000 feet of the shopping
mall. Sergeant Giles testified that the stop occurred "right next" to or "mere feet" from
the shopping center or shopping mall and that the RC Willey , which was connected to the
other stores mentioned, was within the "mall" just off University Parkway (R. 298:140,
172-75, 207). It was undisputed that defendant was stopped near the intersection of Main
Street and 1400 South (R. 298:142). State's exhibit 2 corroborates the sergeant's
testimony that one block is approximately 500 feet (R. 298:207; State's Ex. 2).
Therefore, because University Parkway is only one block from where defendant was
stopped (State's Ex. 2), the inference that the stop was located within 1000 feet of a
shopping "mall" is compelled.
12

strictly defined, does not include a common parking lot or enclosed walkways. Aplt. Br. at
12. Even accepting the authority of these definitions, the distinction defendant attempts is
insubstantial. The statute specifically includes within a drug-free zone a Sparking structure
adjacent'* to a ^shopping mall." Section 58-37-8 (4)(a)(vii). The statute also identifies
numerous locations that do not contain enclosed walkways, for the obvious reason that such
a feature is immaterial to the purposes of the statute. Id. As defendant correctly notes, the
penalty enhancement statute was enacted "to protect the public health, safety and welfare of
children of Utah from the presumed extreme potential danger created when drug transactions
occur on or near . . . [public places frequented by children]." State v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d
146, 149 (Utah App. 1996) (citation omitted) (brackets in original)). Aplt. Br. at 12.
Defendant was stopped next to a RC Willey store, to which was connected a number of
stores, including Media Play, Old Navy, Pet's Mart, Toys 'R' Us, and Kids 4R' Us (R.
298:172-75,199,203). Because these businesses directly serve children and are concentrated
in the same location, they clearly come within the zone protected by the statute.
In short, the evidence amply showed that defendant was within a drug-free zone when
he was stopped.4
4

Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a
directed verdict regarding the drug-free zone enhancement penalty at the close of the
State's case-in-chief. Aplt. Br. at 14-15. However, because defendant's insufficiency
claim is unsupported by the record, this Court need not consider defendant's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. See State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, U 19, 42 P.3d 1248
(holding "trial counsel was not ineffective" for failing to raise an objection to the
sufficiency of the evidence at trial because any such objection "would have been
denied"), cert denied, 53 P.3d 1 (Utah 2002).
13

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the trial court's sentencing decision should be
affirmed.

*4

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this yt>

day of January, 2004

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

Addendum A

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

58-37-8

58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on
separate occasions that sure undertaken in concert with five or
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled substance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conwrtion is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of
a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection
(l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently.

58-37-8

OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(aXi) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony, or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(aXi) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2Xb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii),
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is
guilty of a third degree felony.
(0 Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(aXii) or (2Xa)(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor,
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
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suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
, (iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under
Subsection (4Kb) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
Subsections (4)(aXi) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater,
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(be) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of
age, regardless of where the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years
if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this
subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution
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of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for
probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4),
a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor.
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by
law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance
or substances.
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment.
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
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